Abstract: This study contrasts two national solar home system (SHS) programs that relied on the same World Bank approach, but reached dramatically different results. The Energy Services Delivery Project (ESDP) in Sri Lanka was an exemplary renewable energy access program, successfully installing 21,000 off-grid SHSs alongside grid-connected mini-hydro capacity and off-grid village hydroelectric systems. It reached all of its targets ahead of schedule and below cost. By contrast, the Indonesia Solar Home System Project (ISHSP), which ran from 1997 to 2003, sought to reach one million rural Indonesians through the sales and installation of 200,000 SHSs. However, by project closing in 2003, less than five percent of the original sales target, or only 8,054 units, had been installed. The ESDP and ISHSP were the World Bank's first foray into a "market-based renewable energy services provision model." Based on original research interviews and field observation, the article finds that contrasting the two programs-one a success, the other a failure-offers lessons for energy and development practitioners, namely that effective programs are those that select appropriate technology, often with input from households themselves; they promote community participation and ownership; and they have robust marketing, demonstration, and promotion activities.
Introduction
Lack of access to electricity and dependence on traditional fuels for cooking and heating remains an enduring economic development issue for many countries, one that has catalyzed significant international momentum towards universal energy access via initiatives such as Sustainable Energy for All and the Sustainable Development Goal 7 (Ockwell and Byrne 2017;  International Energy Agency 2017; Gollwitzer et al. 2018) . The International Energy Agency (2018) estimates that worldwide about $13 billion in capital is invested at improving access to electricity or cooking devices annually.
To meet these targets, channel this investment, and capture some of the plentiful cobenefits of energy access (such as reductions in poverty, gender empowerment, improved health, and skills development, to name a few), a variety of programs and business models have blossomed over the past decades (Chaurey et al. 2012; Sovacool 2013a; Halff et al. 2014 ). As merely a glimpse of the depth and complexity of actions, between 2011 and 2015, more than 106 countries have actively and formally engaged with Sustainable Energy for All and provided financial or in-kind contributions or working on tailored national strategies and investment plans (Sustainable Energy for All 2016). One of the most significant technologies for expanding access to modern energy services within these approaches is solar electrification, especially via solar home systems, or SHSs (Ulsrud et al. 2015; Ulsrud et al. 2018 Ockwell et al. 2018 Venkateswaran et al. 2018) .
Despite the abundance of actors promoting solar (and other) energy options, however, one of the most influential remains the World Bank. The World Bank Group (WBG) is a major source of financing for energy and infrastructure projects including pipelines, oil and gas fields, and power plants as well as off-grid energy systems such as solar home systems and micro-hydro Political economy of solar electrification 3 dams. The World Bank in particular is a multilateral institution that provides loans and credit to developing countries to stimulate social and economic development in an attempt to alleviate poverty (Clark 1999; Sovacool 2017 ).
This comparative study contrasts two World Bank funded national SHS programs-one in Sri Lanka, and one in Indonesia-that relied on the same approach but reached dramatically different results. The Energy Services Delivery Project (ESDP) in Sri Lanka cost-effectively installed 21,000 off-grid SHSs and a series of village hydroelectric systems ahead of schedule and below cost.
1 By contrast, the Indonesian Solar Home System Project (ISHSP) reached less than five percent of its target, or only 8,054 units. The ESDP and ISHSP were the World Bank's first foray into what has now become known as a "market-based renewable energy services provision model." Based on original interviews and field research in both countries, this study explores the dynamics of both programs as well as implications for energy access policy more generally.
In contrasting the ESDP with the ISHSP, the article aims to make three contributions.
First, and critically, it analyzes a case of success, commonly referred to as "best practice," alongside a case of failure, or "worst practice." We took a rather simple notion of failure to mean a "successful" project met its goals or produced benefits that exceeded costs; a "failed" project did not meet its goals or had costs that outweighed benefits. In doing so, the study identifies not only the programmatic factors that often result in the success or failure of individual case studies, but also the extent that the complex agendas of international and bilateral energy and development agencies, manufacturers, research planners, politicians, and community leaders harmonize, or hinder, programmatic efforts. Both the energy policy community and perhaps the development community as a whole need to better understand the dynamics of failure alongside the better-known reasons for success.
Second, this study delves into how both Sri Lankan and Indonesian planners attempted to supply energy services in moments of crisis. Sri Lanka was undertaking the ESDP as they dismantled the functions of the welfare state, promoted privatization and restructuring, and emerged from a 26-year old civil war-providing insight for how such tensions can be managed (Caron 2002) . Indonesia was similarly dealing with the Asian Financial Crisis as its national program was unfolding (Sovacool and Drupady 2012) .
Third, the study illuminates how the World Bank designs and implements their energy projects. The WBG's annual average lending ranges $60 to $70 billion in loans, grants, equity investments, and loan guarantees (World Bank 2015) , making it the largest international development bank in the world. Though it operates independently, the WBG's major shareholders are France, Germany, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and its major borrowers are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Russia. Understanding the internal dynamics, processes, and accountability mechanisms of the WBG is therefore of importance for both scholars of environmental governance and energy policy and practitioners of multilateral financial aid. Keohane (2002) describes institutions such as the WBG as "organized anarchies" created to reduce transaction costs, facilitate information, and empower agents to orchestrate complicated actions. This study therefore underscores the differing contextual factors that can hamper or stymie WBG efforts (and perhaps those facing other, similar multilateral financial institutions).
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2. Case study selection and background:
This section briefly justifies Sri Lanka and Indonesia as case studies before summarizing the specific dynamics of each of their national SHS programs.
Sri Lanka's Energy Services Delivery Project (ESDP)
At the turn of the millennium, Sri Lanka faced a series of daunting energy security and development challenges. It was primarily a biomass centered energy sector, with 47.4 percent of demand met from fuelwood and dung, 43 percent petroleum, and 9.5 percent hydropower (Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority 2009). Seventy percent of households depended on biomass, mostly for cooking, and electricity represented only 7 percent of overall energy use.
Moreover, 60 percent of household demand for electricity went to one use only, lighting (Nagendran 2001) . About half of the population earned less than $2 per day (Integrated Development Association 2004).
To minimize the health implications of households biomass use, diversify the energy sector, and improve incomes for communities, the WBG and Global Environment Facility (GEF) initiated the $55.3 million ESDP Project in 1997. The ESDP aggressively promoted SHSs alongside various community based micro-hydro projects, a wind energy pilot, and energy efficiency investments. Its key objectives were to provide electricity to rural households, strengthen the regulatory environment in favor of energy efficiency, improve private sector performance, and reduce carbon emissions (Sovacool 2013b (Kapadia 2003) .
A capacity-building component supported a wide array of capacity building activities.
One of the first tasks to be undertaken was an extensive feasibility study of 1,048 villages to determine possible sites for SHS deployment. It was this collection of initial market surveys and pre-investment studies where planners discovered that end users were willing to pay slightly more upfront if energy services were more reliable and safer-e.g., SHS were perceived more favorably than kerosene and diesel. The ESDP established a Technical Advisory Committee to set standards for manufacturers. It provided funds for the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) to prepare a National Renewable Energy Strategy and establish a Pre-Electrification Unit within the utility to provide support and training to the Credit Component discussed above. Funds were also available to participating credit institutions (PCIs) to prepare feasibility studies, business plans, and document bank loans, and grants were given to developers and village organizations to raise awareness about the ESDP and promote the proper installation of equipment. (Sovacool 2013b ).
Furthermore, the ESDP attracted private sector developers into the renewable energy sector through public-private partnerships, set national grid interconnection and tariff standards, and instigated the formation of hydro, wind, solar, and energy efficiency industry groups.
Indonesia's Solar Home System Project (ISHSP)
Indonesia is a vast, sprawling archipelago of more than 13,600 islands covering an area of roughly two million square kilometers or a little less than three times the size of Texas (the second largest state in the United States). Known as the "spice islands" throughout much of its history, it is the largest country in Southeast Asia both in terms of population and size, and it is blessed with an abundance of natural resources. In 1995, the country was still riding a wave of high economic growth resulting from the dramatic increase in oil export revenues in the 1970s (World Bank 2011).
Moreover, the abundant oil and gas sectors were supplying over 85 percent of the country's commercial net energy consumption (World Bank 1996) . With 70 percent of the population still living in rural areas, expanding rural electrification was integral to the government's economic development strategy. Rural electrification coverage in Indonesia was still at 40 percent -well below the regional average (World Bank 1996) . In 1995, however, a local entrepreneur in West Java managed to sell 4,000 SHS units on credit in the first year of operation (Miller and Hope 2000) . Seemingly, technological innovations coupled with the availability of compatible and energy-efficient devices had made the SHS market more competitive. Thus, in the absence of grid connection, the lesson appeared to be that rural households were willing to pay market prices for a reliable alternative (Sovacool and Drupady 2012) , and a window of opportunity was emerging.
These market trends convinced planners to embark on "something big" to simultaneously . It was to be a massive undertaking, requiring serious investments to be made into both developing Indonesia's solar photovoltaic (PV) market and formulating a national energy access policy to incentivize the adoption of renewable energy technologies.
Political economy of solar electrification 9
However, rather than relying on government funding, the bulk of the project's costs of $67.3 million was to be financed mainly on credit from sub-borrowers (SHS dealers) and end-users (rural customers) as summarized in Table 1 . The idea was to target only those villagers willing and able to pay for electricity services in order to nurture and develop a self-sustaining solar PV sector. The main part of the project was the credit component which sought to extend electricity Rural areas that could not expect grid connection from PLN in the next three years or more were identified in the provinces of West Java, Lampung, and South Sulawesi as potential regional markets, with the intent of including North Sumatera at a later stage. All these provinces had rural communities with strong purchasing power due to cash crops such as coffee, cacao, and palm oil (World Bank 2004) . West Java was additionally selected due to the initial success of the local entrepreneur mentioned above and also because of proximity to the capital, Jakarta. A population of 38 million easily made it the most populous province in Indonesia at the time, with 19 million people still waiting for electricity and other critical infrastructure (Retnanestri 2007) .
Political economy of solar electrification 11
A project-approved 50 Wp SHS unit with the necessary components, the only one eligible under the program, cost between $550 and $800 at that time, depending on the sales location (World Bank 2004) . Dealers would typically offer credit to prospective customers based on a first cost buy-down in the range of $75 to $100, funded by a separate GEF grant mentioned below. This would bring down the unit cost balance to a level that could be paid in monthly installments over a period of four to five years, in amounts roughly comparable to conventional monthly energy expenditures for kerosene. Customers would in turn be responsible for servicing their own systems, although dealers could provide service contracts or guarantees for a limited period.
The World Bank estimated that credit installments and the interest generated would provide approximately $66.8 million equivalent of the project costs. In addition, a GEF grant of $20 million equivalent, translating into a first-cost subsidy ranging from $75 to $125 for every SHS unit sold, would be awarded to each dealer upon extending credit to customers. This benefit could either be passed on to customers to make the SHS units even more affordable or be used to further develop the business (for example to recruit new staff, establish new rural outlets, or expand product inventory).
Despite the promising signs from West Java, the size of the project's budget, and its distribution of risks via a market based approach, the ISHSP was essentially a failure. During its years of operation from 1997 to 2003, it installed only slightly more than 8,000 units, had negligible effects on solar manufacturing, and limited impacts to Indonesia's rural energy balance. A purposive sampling strategy was employed, meaning experts with extensive knowledge of the ESDP or ISHSP were chosen to participate, and a critical stakeholder analysis framework was utilize to include respondents from government, civil society, business, academia, and local communities. Respondents therefore came from:
• Government agencies including the Agency for the Development and Implementation of In Sri Lanka, these interviews took place not only in Colombo, the capital, but also Battaramulla, Dagama, Hambantota , Meddawatte, Moratuwa, Watawala, and Yatiyanthota, as well as the World Bank headquarters in Washington, DC, United States. In Indonesia, interviews took place not only in Jakarta but also Jangari Village (West Java), Lake Cirata (West Java), and Serdang Village (Lampung).
During these research interviews, participants were asked (a) identify the benefits of the ESDP and ISHSP, (b) summarize some of the key barriers to implementation it had to confront, and (c) discuss general lessons that it offers energy policy and development practitioners. Due to Institutional Review Board guidelines and grant requirements, as well as the request of some participants, such data is presented as anonymous in the study, though information from the interviews was often digitally recorded and always carefully coded.
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To ensure a degree of triangulation and reliability, research interviews were augmented with direct observation and site visits to four solar energy facilities shown in Table 2 . These included a mix of different provinces and technologies. The site visits allowed the research team to discuss the implications of the ESDP and ISHSP with actual renewable energy operators, managers, and manufacturers. They also served as a useful vehicle to arrange additional research interviews. The research team lastly supplemented interviews, site visits, and community consultations with an extensive review of reports and peer-reviewed articles relating to energy policy in both countries.
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4. The political economy of solar success: Sri Lanka
As this section of the paper argues, that the ESDP was a success is practically incontrovertible (Sovacool 2013b Trained 748 CEB and energy professionals through 26 programs on energy efficiency
Created an electric appliance labelling program.
On-premises load metering of 15 major customers completed Various training and awareness campaigns implemented Note: MW=megawatt. kW=kilowatt. CEB=Ceylon Electricity Board. SPPAs=small power purchase agreements. GWh=Gigawatt-hour.
Given the focus of this comparative study, the remainder of this subsection will focus exclusively on the solar home system component. At the close of the project, Sri Lanka was home to a vibrant industry of suppliers, developers, consultants, and trainers in the renewable energy sector, with 4 major solar companies compared to 2 at the start, and 15 developers compared to 2 at the start. Eighty electricity consumer associates existed compared to less than 10 at the start. Although the program started with dependence on Nepali technology, by its end Sri Lankan manufacturing had reached the point where they were exporting systems to overseas markets in Asia and Africa. DFCC Bank, the Administrative Unit (AU), was approached in December 2002 to distribute an additional 6,000 SHS outside of the project's scope. As one respondent proclaimed, "ESDP has had a lasting, positive mark on the renewable energy industry in Sri Lanka -it laid the entire foundation, caused a complete shift in the country's energy planning." And here's the kicker: it achieved all of these benefits below cost, budgeted for $55.2 million but spending only $44.5 million-savings that resulted from a combination of the creation of economies of scale, technological learning, and capacity building.
The next three subsections focus inductively on three of the most significant benefits from the solar component to the EFSD: accelerated household adoption, income generation, and the improvement of industry technical standards and training.
Accelerated diffusion of solar home systems
At the peak of the SHS subcomponent, after SEEDs became a PCI more than 1,300 systems were being sold each month, and four major vendors-Shell Solar, Access Solar, SELCO, and Alpha Thermal-established national networks. Only a few systems were sold nationwide in 1998, but almost 20,000 had been sold by 2001. Planners realized that as areas became "saturated" with SHS units vendors tended to close their shops and move to provinces where demand was "fresh," essentially leaving no dedicated maintenance support facilities.
The ESDP therefore supported the creation of 80 permanent service and distribution centers with $5 million invested from the private sector. Over the duration of the ESDP, overall Political economy of solar electrification 17 employment in the industry jumped from 50 to 1,500, and a Social Industry Association was established. As the owner of one major solar distributor noted, "Before the ESDP, we were selling 5 or 6 systems per month in town areas, not rural areas, and we had one branch office in Colombo; now, we're installing 40 to 50 systems per month, mostly in rural areas throughout five branches." Table 4 shows that most of these systems ended up being 20 to 40Wp (32 percent) and 40 to 60 Wp (59 percent), and the subcomponent had a tiered subsidy which gave larger disbursements for smaller, less expensive systems. As 
Community energy and income generation
Rising community incomes, and potent participation from local banks and villages in the ESDP, is also a testament to its success. Over the course of the project, PCIs contributed $16 million of their own funds, several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were operating in tandem with the ESDP project areas, and more than 30 villages were asking for solar or microhydro systems (World Bank 2003). As one bank manager told us, "we weren't participating out of any sense of charity, we were driven by commercial viability." Members of the AU also told the research team that "no major complaints" had ever arisen regarding the SHS and gridconnected components.
Indeed, an extensive survey done by the World Bank at the close of the project found that energy access through the ESDP promoted income generating activities, increased safety, longer studying, and a variety of other activities shown in Figure 3 . SHS units, for example, cost only Unfortunately, these measures proved ineffective. The World Bank (2004: 15) admitted that the project became plagued by "slow progress of the SHS sales, weak investment in rural distribution networks, and inability of the banks to make loans to SHS dealers." Our interviews with key stakeholders reflecting on the project years onwards suggest that the reasons for project failure may have been more fundamental, and that perhaps the financial crisis became an excuse rather than a major impetus.
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Indeed, in this section, we inductively draw from the data to summarize three core factors behind the program's failure: high capital costs, a poorly designed credit vehicle, and inadequate dealer support.
High capital costs in a time of crisis
Lacking a workable credit facility to make systems more affordable and a proper supply chain to reduce transaction costs, the development of the solar PV market was further impeded by several factors that the project design was not able to rectify. Certainly, the financial crisis affected the purchasing power of many potential customers that saw slumps in the value of their cash crops.
Most damaging, however, was that the project had to bear foreign exchange costs of imported SHS components amounting to approximately $85 million equivalent, or more than 70 percent of project costs (World Bank 1996) . Solar panels, the most expensive component, were imported from Japan, Korea, and Germany. Some SHS parts such as charge controllers, batteries, and energy-efficient bulbs were already being produced domestically at the time, yet contained a significant amount of imported parts and materials.
Unsurprisingly, dealers used the opportunity of the financial crisis to venture into foreign solar PV markets and benefit from the much stronger US Dollar. The Implementation Completion
Report cites the success of certain dealers in exporting balance of system components to Sri Lanka as part of the World Bank's ESDP as well as for commercial sales in Kenya (World Bank 2004).
Respondents felt that instead of subsidizing foreign PV markets, the project could have invested some of this funding into developing the domestic solar PV assembling and manufacturing industry, which would have gradually brought down dependence on imports and consequent high SHS costs. Although the BPPT did make some inroads in this direction, the industry is still underdeveloped today, very much dependent on imported content, and so far unable to reap the benefits of economies of scale, despite the fact that the country has recovered remarkably from the financial crisis.
Mismatched credit vehicle and a weak banking sector
The project's credit component was ill equipped from the beginning to help the fledging solar PV industry overcome first cost hurdles. This was mainly due to a poorly conceived credit facility that failed to provide the suitable financial infrastructure and banking products for a rural clientele, and to support struggling SHS dealers.
At the start of the project, Indonesia's solar PV market was what the World Bank characterized as in a "high price low volume" equilibrium (World Bank 2004). As SHSs are selfcontained generation and distribution systems, the initial capital cost is very high in proportion to the total operating and maintenance costs over the lifecycle -in many cases, representing almost one year of income in low-and middle-income rural households (Cabraal et al. 1997 ). Moreover, under Indonesian banking practices, commercial banks were only allowed to offer credit over a period of one or two years, which is hardly an affordable period of cost amortization for such households. Despite the various measures that had been put into place under the project, the World Bank (2004: 21) noted "a lack of established high-volume supplier-dealer chains, high prices, and a lack of term credit" continued to hamper market development.
As mentioned above, a $20 million equivalent IBRD loan was channeled through Bank Indonesia to four PBs to provide SHS dealers with access to capital investment and to allow them to offer credit lines to prospective customers. Due to repercussions of the Asian Financial Crisis, however, two of the selected PBs were not able to participate due to their dire financial situation;
whereas the other two remained wary of Bank Indonesia's increasingly strict regulations on nonperforming loans (NPLs) even after their recapitalization was completed in the middle of 2000. In
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the end, only one PB was prepared to offer any credit, and despite keen interest from SHS dealers, only $0.1 million of the $20 million loan was utilized before the World Bank (2004) 
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At the same time, it appears that potential customers, at least in some target communities, did not properly understand the supposed benefits of the credit facility. Among the SHS users we interviewed, some had made use of the available credit to pay for their systems, but an equal number of respondents had paid cash, as they were unfamiliar with the banking practices in general. These respondents generally represented households that were in the upper-income bracket of the rural population. With more disposable income, they typically had larger SHS units and used the electricity for some productive uses such as lighting fishponds or small convenience shops. They were also often former owners of diesel-powered generators, glad to be using more economical systems.
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However, we also encountered those respondents from lower-income households that had little or no source of lighting prior to their SHS units and had benefitted from either free government-funded SHS programs and/or the cheaper second hand SHS market rather than from participating directly in the project. One of these respondents commented that had it not been for However, because it was the dealers rather than the PBs, the WBG, or the government that were responsible for complex and arduous task of administering the loans to customers and monitoring compliance, it was also ultimately the dealers left with shouldering the financial risk of loan defaults. "It would have been far preferable for us that banks be in charge of the loans," mentioned one respondent. "When banks are responsible for collecting payments, companies can focus on providing the SHS and related services."
Inadequate dealer capacity
As PBs lacked the rural networks to deal directly with customers, a dealer-sales model was employed, whereby six Jakarta-based dealers were tasked to establish rural outlets and would take
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responsibility for the procurement, sales, installation and maintenance of SHS units; and for offering term credit to make the systems more affordable to prospective customers. The eligibility criteria for dealers included proven business competence, the existence of sales or services infrastructure in the targeted markets, and a credit agreement with a PB (Martinot et al. 2001 ).
However, our data revealed that SHS dealers were mainly small and inexperienced enterprises in a nascent market, peddling an unfamiliar product and novel concept of electricity services. Deprived of their main source of investment capital from the very beginning due to the reluctance of PBs to offer credit, dealers were further constrained in their ability to finance and develop their businesses as the price of SHSs jumped three-fold following the drastic depreciation of Indonesian currency. This was especially true after the IBRD loan was terminated and dealers only had the option of using their own financing to continue their businesses. "Without credit from the banks, we had to provide financing from our own pockets," explained one respondent "This was very tough for small businesses like ours." Even when sales targets were reduced from 200,000 to 70,000 units in 2001, dealers were still not able maintain sufficient inventories and establish the necessary rural outlets. As described by another respondent, "I had to cover three whole regencies with only one motorbike. It was an impossible job."
Rather than being allowed to focus on building a proper SHS supply chain and a rural service infrastructure, dealers also had to build their rural credit delivery and collection infrastructure -both requiring very different sets of skills and expertise. In this context, respondents felt strongly that "the magnitude of the installation targets was not comparable with the efforts to build capacity." Apart from a few workshops that were limited to sending only a few staff at a time, there was very little support for dealers to upgrade their skills and expertise, develop
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their businesses, approach banks for financing, learn about rural credit, and address problems on the ground. The grants provided by GEF did little to improve their "unsatisfactory" performance as the project required that dealers offer credit to their customers as a condition of eligibility to receive these grants. This caused problems for dealers who did not feel secure enough to borrow or extend credit. Moreover, as a respondent lamented, "A $100 for every SHS sold is not enough.
They should have increased the grant amount after the crisis."
Discussion: Five Broader Lessons for Energy Access Programs
Apart from offering a stark tale of contrasts, the ESDP and ISHSP offer five broader lessons for energy and development practitioners and researchers. .
Polycentric involvement of financial institutions
The ESDP had a highly participatory project design involving the national utility, private developers, and local groups, and institutionalized stakeholder engagement with quarterly meetings and ad hoc consultations. It reveals the usefulness of including a broad set of stakeholders in program implementation-from the communities themselves and NGOs to the commercial and public sectors. The ESDP mobilized communities at the grassroots level, working with villagers, councils, provincial officials, and Electricity Consumer Societies. This ensured project ownership on the part of communities and strengthened community capacity to effectively manage SHS, and it involved the financial and microfinance sector. Unlike Indonesia, it selected strong PCIs with national networks, including commercial banks giving wholesale loans to firms as well as microfinance organizations, like SEEDs, to provide smallscale household loans "where ordinary banks cannot." It also awarded grants and capacity building efforts to local manufacturers and distributors. As one respondent put it, "The ESDP
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was private sector oriented, not government sector oriented; if it was a government sponsored thing, it would not have worked as well, my guess is half the money would have gone into the pockets of politicians." The ESDP in Sri Lanka had a strong AU behind it plus a collection of banks and trade and industry associations. These included the Solar Industries Association and a
Federation of Electricity Consumer Societies in addition to a dedicated NGO (Practical Action) and impassioned microfinance institution (SEEDS). As one respondent explained, "one of the reasons the ESD succeeded is because the government stayed out-the private sector just ran with it, guided by the AU." Essentially, this involvement of diverse and heterogeneous actors ensured that "multiple layers of auditing and accountability" were created to sustain the project.
In Indonesia, by contrast, the four PBs that had been selected were still unfamiliar with investments in the renewable energy sector and none of the six appointed SHS dealers had developed an effective supply chain and financial mechanism to deploy SHSs on the scale intended by the project. The solar PV market was still very much in its infancy and the project therefore needed greater government involvement to guarantee appropriate the institutional and regulatory environment. Moreover, the ISHSP saw SHS vendors generally overwhelmed from having to provide credit lines to potential customers and collect installments to pay enough attention to after-sales services. As a consequence, Indonesian customers had to be responsible for their own maintenance and servicing. The credit component of the Indonesia SHS Project failed to adjust to the economic realities of the Asian Financial Crisis. With little domestic manufacturing and assembly, the program was entirely dependent on foreign components, which meant the regional crisis saw the devaluation of Indonesian currency and a threefold increase in the costs of SHS systems.
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The credit component of the Indonesia SHS project was designed to overcome the first cost barrier found to be critical in the uptake of capital-intensive technologies such as SHSs in rural areas (Miller and Hope 2000) . However, no stakeholder was willing to fully shoulder the investment risks of an unchartered rural market for solar PV technology. What was needed was a responsive financial infrastructure that provided several mechanisms to reduce the risk of investing in a new market and that allowed for greater flexibility to adapt business models to changing market signals. The Indonesia SHS Project did none of these things.
Additionally, dealers decided to export systems out of Indonesia to take advantage of the strong US dollar, meaning the program in essence subsidized overseas investment rather than the domestic expansion of energy access. The BPPT as the principle implementing agency did very little to adjust the project design to properly involve financial institutions, SHS vendors, and endusers in the project -mainly letting the Asian Financial Crisis take its toll. As a result, at the end of the project, two out of the four participating banks had gone bust, only one out of the six approved SHS dealers remained in business, and only a disappointing 8,054 out of 200,000 sales were achieved.
Flexibility in technological scope and geographic coverage
The ESDP demonstrates the viability of flexibility in at least three senses. One is a strategic flexibility involving where to extend the national grid, where to push for village hydropowered microgrids, and where to deploy isolated SHS units. The ESDP promoted all three types of technologies-grid-connected, mini-grid, and off-grid-but only in particular areas, and never in the same place. Another is that it had flexible business and financial models matched in scale to each of these three technologies. For SHS units, the ESDP mostly supported solar dealers who formed credit partnerships with banks and microfinance institutions. No "one size fits all approach" was employed; instead the ESDP was "very targeted" and "differentiated." A third is the flexibility inherent in modifying and revising the program itself in the face of feedback and challenges. When it became apparent that the SHS subcomponent was not meeting its targets, the scheme was revised and SEEDs brought in as a PCI. Managers of the ESDP, as one respondent put it, "quickly and effectively responded to issues raised by stakeholders."
Another noted that the "beauty of the project is that it had the flexibility to acknowledge failures and change the rules, operating guidelines were inherently flexible and adaptable."
In Indonesia, planners pushed solar energy because expert consultants told them to, not because communities had expressed an organic demand for the technology. It appears llittle effort was made to fully understand the true energy needs of the targeted population or to involve them in the project design. According to respondents, there was never a study sufficiently done to assess whether the technology has been understood and accepted by the wider Indonesian population. In fact, many questioned the choice of SHSs in the first place, perceived by some as an unfamiliar technology "imposed on Indonesia" from the World Bank rather than a "need stemming from an expressed interest of the rural population." Doubts were raised whether the technology was even suitable for sufficient solar irradiation considering frequent cloud cover, high levels of humidity in the tropics, and the fact that many of the remote areas targeted are in dense forest areas. In this regard, it was suggested that perhaps concentrated solar power or other renewable energy sources such as geothermal, hydro, or biogas could have been more appropriate solutions for rural electrification.
Also, only one type of SHS was eligible, unlike the flexibility enshrined in the ESDP.
The dismal sales of SHS units were not simply a reflection of reduced purchasing power of endusers and retailers due to the Asian Financial Crisis. Many end-users did not place enough importance on electrification. Moreover, competing government initiatives deploying SHS through grant mechanisms severely hampered the market-based approach of the program. While end-users did not mind using SHS units, they naturally preferred waiting for government subsidies or buying from the cheaper second-hand market. In this regard, the selection of provinces was based on a presumed rather than expressed need from the communities targeted.
While the program did successfully develop technical specifications, testing, and certification, the inexperienced and disinterested BPPT was not able to translate these gains into opportunities for other stakeholders, especially fledging local SHS companies.
The provinces chosen for potential target markets were also in question considering not many dealers had networks in Lampung and South Sulawesi at the beginning of the project. As a result, most were functionally excluded from taking part. Some respondents were of the opinion that the selection of the target areas was too ambitious, whereas others thought that the project could have included more provinces and did not do enough to leverage on the natural strongholds of many other competent SHS dealers.
Political harmonization and support
The ESDP affirms the salience of political harmonization in two ways: strong leadership from project champions, and alignment with other national policies and frameworks. In terms of leadership, the ESDP thrived under a "strong," "dedicated," and "fiercely independent" AU, DFCC Bank, willing to "initially sustain losses from operations for the first three years." As one respondent explained, "one of the reasons the ESDP succeeded is because the government stayed out-the private sector just ran with it, guided by the AU." In terms of regulatory alignment, when the ESDP began, only the national utility CEB could generate power and off-grid generators were "technically illegal". Planners had to implement the entire "community and Indonesia demonstrates the opposite. Government subsidies and price incentives gave the "wrong" signals, with other ongoing programs giving away solar panels for free and the government increasing subsidies for kerosene. The national government expanded the grid to communities that had just purchased SHS units, flooding the secondary market and mitigating the desire for households to pay for systems. Most respondents we interviewed criticized the continued prevalence of free SHSs provided through government-funded programs in parallel to the project. Some villagers we talked to in Lampung mentioned that they had preferred to wait for these free SHSs, even though stocks were limited and the waiting lists were long, rather than purchase their own units. Other villagers had continued to use kerosene lamps, benefiting from highly politicized government subsidies that were only stopped in 2000.
A lack of coordination with PLN (the national state owned electric utility) was another problem as former customers living in target areas that were eventually abandoned by dealers due to the availability of grid electricity flooded the market with cheaper and less-regulated secondhand SHSs. Many villagers we interviewed during our field visits admitted that they had gotten their systems from this second-hand market. These respondents stated that they preferred to receive "inferior goods" rather than pay the premium for a new system. Considering the well-known fact of inadequate after-sales services -which at some point became practically non-existent after all but one dealer remained in business during the project -it was perhaps not a poor choice to make.
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The ESDP built capacity through grants, technical assistance, and outreach in a variety of ways, many of which proved to be very effective. It facilitated feasibility and pre-investment studies of household energy use as well as renewable resource potential. It did initial market surveys to ask communities what they wanted, and to determine their willingness to pay (if any) for electricity. These studies improved local capabilities and the understanding of markets, strengthened community knowledge of resources, and aided in cost recovery. They, in the words of one respondent, ensured that "market principles, based on sound economic data, determined the proper course of action for each community." The ESDP improved the capacity of PCIs so that their turnaround time for loans dropped from more than three months to less than one month.
It implemented technical standards to improve the quality of Sri Lankan technology and ultimately protect consumers. These preempted common problems related to over-usage, misusage, maintenance and repairs were less common and more easily addressed when they did occur. These standards also "ensured the quality, safety, and longevity" of the equipment involved in the ESDP. The ESDP supported the construction of 80 service centers for solar equipment so that the maintenance needs of rural households were always cared for. Finally, it implemented a string of awareness raising activities so that educated consumers could make informed purchase decisions-whether it was an small independent power manager contemplating a micro-hydro project, a village leader thinking about off-grid hydro, or a household considering a SHS. These included demonstrations, advertising campaigns, workshops, and seminars.
The ESDP awareness campaign in particular targeted provincial officials and village decision makers and trained them in basic renewable energy concepts, financial options, and ads, and radio broadcasts promoting SHS. One of them is shown in Figure 5 . These awareness efforts were not "one way." The ESDP also sought feedback from households, village energy committees, and operators themselves through formal surveys and informal workshops. Based on this feedback, planners learned that common problems facing the SHS subcomponent were improper battery charging, wiring defects, loose connections, and incorrect mounting of the solar panel. In Indonesia, however, capacity building was underutilized. The program spent 95 percent of its budget on technology and only five percent on capacity building. Due to limited funds, dealers were not able to afford television or radio commercials or even brochures. Thus, in order to reach as many people as possible, usually a technician would make a presentation in each village community center, followed by a technical demonstration. "It was always a very formal affair," explained one respondent. "It was very important to ensure that the village chief is present in this presentation, to give him respect. If you are able to convince him regarding the importance of the SHS and the legitimacy of your business, it is easier to approach and educate other villagers." These marketing campaigns, scarce and homegrown as they were, were all too infrequent.
Programmatic self-sufficiency
Lastly, and critically, the ESDP cultivated a self-sustaining market for SHS (that no longer needed the program to thrive, at least until massive investments in grid electrification occurred after the end of the project) whereas the ISHSP was all too dependent on government largesse.
The ESDP cultivated commercial viability by ensuring that technologies were not "given away" and by sharing costs among its stakeholders. It forcefully demonstrates that households are willing to pay more than they usually do for energy expenditures as long as their supply is reliable and safe. It altered the energy development approach of the government from a "dole out" mentality to one based on "sustainable markets," one requiring that communities participate themselves in hydro and solar projects by offering not only their cash but also labor and materials; and one demanding higher than usual returns on investment, always in the double digit range. This focus on commercial viability did three things: it created a sense of community ownership, it meant end-users no longer viewed energy services as a "charity" or "free entitlement," and it largely resulted in a market for renewable energy that could sustain itself after the ESDP ended.
In Indonesia, by comparison, BPPT's success in testing and certification of SHSs did not translate into better capacity building opportunities for other stakeholders. "BPPT was in a very privileged position. As the focal point of the project, it benefited from all capacity building efforts. But it did not encourage other elements of the market to grow," criticized one respondent. The premature closing of the IBRD loan, which resulted in all but one dealer going
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out of business, also indicates that dealers were not successful in developing the capacity to enter the market without project support let alone being able to independently catalyze commercial demand for solar PV technology. "There was a large vacuum in the solar PV market until 2005," described another respondent.
Conclusion
In sum, the success of Sri Lanka's ESDP contrasted with the failure of Indonesia's ISHSP reminds us forcefully that a similar market-based approach to energy access and solar electrification-in this case, one adopted by the World Bank-can produce drastically different effects. How? Sri Lanka's ESDP exhibits the strength of having a well-designed financial model and credit facility, a dedicated implementing agency, and stakeholder participation and capacity building. The ESDP allowed end-users to take charge of their electricity needs in the absence of government provision, reaching villages which would have otherwise not have received electricity services. It improved the financial status of many rural villages and resulted in productive activities such as sewing and carpentry; and also substantially lessened consumption of kerosene, producing public health benefits. It benefited from cost-sharing among development donors, financial institutions, vendors, and end-users -tailoring financial requirements for different stakeholders and project components. In other words, a demand-driven approach was adopted to design multiple financial models to suit multiple stakeholder needs rather than purely "free money."
The ISHSP in Indonesia failed to overcome first cost barriers, secure sufficient government involvement, and engender long-term sustainability. It suffered from an improperly designed financial model that calculated risks and incentives poorly, limited capacity building for local stakeholders, and minimal effort to inquire about what Indonesian end-users desired or needed -
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as they were merely seen as passive energy consumers. The Indonesian government was almost totally uncoordinated in the implementation of the project. Private sector players and financial institutions lacked knowledge about solar energy and were risk averse, and many users remained uninformed about SHS or uninterested in electricity altogether. In essence, the Indonesia SHS Project failed because it did not adapt or adjust to local circumstances and needs.
The confluence of success and failure-effective versus flawed financing vehicles, adequate versus poorly structured SHS supply chains, and harmonized versus fragmented government policy-remind us that promoting energy access and responding to energy poverty are highly Without the proper alignment of economic, technical, and political factors, even those projects with the best intentions can quickly fail to achieve their goals.
